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1. Introduction 
It  is  generally  believed  that  higher  competition benefits consumers
1 (Metzenbaum, 
1993,  Gans,  2005  and  Hausman  and  Lebtag,  2007),  and  encourage  the  antitrust 
authorities to foster competition. We show that this view can be misleading in the 
presence  of  welfare-maximising  nationalised  firms.  Using  a  simple  model  with  a 
nationalised  firm,  we  show  that  entry  of  private  profit-maximising  firms  makes 
consumers worse off compared to nationalised monopoly. Entry increases profit of the 
incumbent firm, industry profit and social welfare at the expense of the consumers. 
Our result is important for competition policy. 
  Nationalised  or  state-owned  firms  in  industries,  such  as  airline,  rail, 
telecommunication,  electricity,  natural  gas,  banking,  insurances,  health  care, 
broadcasting and education, are very common in many developing, developed and 
transitional economies.
2 Although many of these industries were initially characterised 
by entry restrictions on private firms, several countries such as India, Taiwan and 
Japan relaxed entry regulation in recent years. Hence, a proper account for the effects 
of  competition  in  industries  with  nationalised  firms  deserves  attention.  While  the 
existence of nationalised firms is viewed as an indirect regulatory mechanism (Cremer 
et al., 1989 and De Fraja and Delbono, 1989), we show that the effect of competition 
on consumers is non-trivial and may go against the consumers. 
 
                                                 
1 Promotion of consumer welfare is the common goal of consumer protection and competition policies. 
The document by the U.S. Department of Justice says “Consumers benefit from competition through 
lower  prices  and  better  products  and  services” 
(http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm). 
2 Among the developed countries, nationalised firms are more prominent in Europe, Canada and Japan. 
They are less prominent in the USA, yet present in industries such as packaging and overnight-delivery 
(Ishida and Matsushima, 2009).  
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2. The model and the results 
2.1. Nationalised monopoly 
Consider monopoly of a welfare-maximising nationalised firm (called firm 1) that 
produces with a constant marginal cost of production c > 0. Assume that the inverse 
market demand function is P(q) with  0 P′<  and  0 P′′≤ , where P is price and q is the 
total output. 
Firm 1 produces output to maximise welfare of the economy, which is sum of 
the  industry  profit  and  consumer  surplus.  Hence,  firm  1  determines  output  to 








Max P q dq cq − ∫  .                         (1) 
The equilibrium output is given by 
 
m P c = ,                            (2) 
implying zero profit of firm 1 under nationalised monopoly. 
 
2.2. Entry of private profit-maximising firms 
Now consider entry of n private profit-maximising firms, each of them produces at the 
marginal cost of production d, with d < c and d is assumed to be zero for simplicity. 
We assume that the outputs of the firms are homogeneous.  
We consider the following game under entry.  At stage 1, the nationalised firm 
(firm 1) determines output to maximise welfare. At stage 2, all private firms choose 
outputs simultaneously. We solve the game through backward induction. 
  At least two justifications can be given for the above game structure. First 
justification  comes  from  the  empirical  side.  As  mentioned  in  Fjell  and  Heywood   3
(2002), many industries such as telecommunications, electricity and postal services 
are  dominated  by  former  nationalised  firms  with  a  first  mover  advantage,  thus 
justifying the  role of the nationalised firm as a Stackelberg leader and the private 
profit-maximising firms as Stackelberg followers. Second justification comes from 
the theoretical side. It follows from Pal (1998), Jacques (2004) and Lu (2007) that, in 
our analysis, an observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) will create an 
equilibrium  where  the  nationalised  firm  and  the  private  firms  behave  like  a 
Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg followers respectively.
3  
Now  determine  the  equilibrium  outputs  of  the  firms  under  entry.  The  ith 
private firm determines output to maximise the following expression:  
( )
i
i q MaxP q q ,  2,3,..., 1 i n = + .                               (3) 
The equilibrium output of the ith follower is given by  
  0 i P q P′ + = ,    2,3,..., 1 i n = + .                    (4) 
Due to the symmetry of the private firms, the nationalised firm (firm 1) maximises the 
following expression to determine output: 







q Max P q cq
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3 See  De  Fraja  and  Delbono  (1989)  for  an  earlier  work  on  Stackelberg  competition  in  a  mixed  
oligopoly.   4
  The total output under entry is given by 
1
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,                          (7) 
since  0 i P q P′ + = . 








,  (2)  and  (6)  show  that  entry  of  the  profit-maximising  firms 
reduces the equilibrium output of firm 1. Since it follows from (7) that the equilibrium 
P is greater than c, the equilibrium price is lower under nationalised monopoly than 
under entry with Stackelberg competition. Hence, competition makes the consumers 
worse off if the nationalised firm behaves like a Stackelberg leader. Since P > c in (7), 
it also implies that the profit of the nationalised firm is positive under entry while it is 
zero  under  nationalised  monopoly.  Hence,  entry  increases  profit  of  the  incumbent 
nationalised firm. 
  It is intuitive to argue that entry increases welfare compared to nationalised 
monopoly.  Under  entry,  the  welfare-maximising  nationalised  firm  could  increase 
welfare compared to nationalised monopoly by choosing its monopoly output, while 
the profit-maximising firms chose respective positive outputs. Since the equilibrium 
output of the nationalised firm under entry is different from its monopoly output, it is 
trivial that the equilibrium welfare under entry is higher compared to the situation 
where the nationalised firm produces its monopoly output under entry. Hence, it is 
immediate that entry increases welfare compared to nationalised monopoly. Higher 
welfare under entry compared to nationalised monopoly is created at the expense of 
the consumers. 
  The following proposition summarises the above discussion.   5
 
Proposition  1:  If  c  >  0,  entry  by  private  profit-maximising  firms  behaving  like 
Stackelberg followers, (i) reduces output of the nationalised firm, (ii) increases profit 
of the nationalised firm, (iii) reduces consumer surplus, and (iv) increases welfare of 
the economy, compared to nationalised monopoly.  
 
  Considering all profit-maximising firms, Pal and Sarkar (2001) and Mukherjee 
and Zhao (2009) show that entry of a firm can raise the profits of some incumbents by 
stealing  market  shares  from  other  incumbents.  In  contrast,  entry  in  our  analysis 
increases profit of the incumbent nationalised firm in the absence of other incumbents. 
Lower total output under entry is responsible for our result.  
 
2.2. An example 
Now we provide an example with a linear demand function, P = a – q, for the above 
analysis. 
  Straightforward  calculation  shows  that,  under  nationalised  monopoly,  the 
equilibrium output of firm 1, price of the product, profit of firm 1 and welfare  are 
respectively 
m q a c = − , 
m P c = ,  1 0







  Now consider entry of n profit-maximising firms. It is easy to check that if 
firm 1 and the entrants behave like a Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg followers, the 
equilibrium output of firm 1, the equilibrium output of the ith entrant, the total output 
of the firms, price of the product, profit of firm 1, profit of the ith entrant and welfare   6
are  respectively 
2
1 ( 1)
s q a c n = − + ,  ( 1)
s
i q c n = + ,  ( 1)
s q a c n = − + ,  ( 1)
s P c n = + , 
2
1 ( ( 1) )
s cn a c n π = − + , 
2 2 ( 1)
s
i c n n π = +  and 
2 2 2 2 ( 1)
2




  The comparison of the equilibrium values under nationalised monopoly and 
entry confirms Proposition 1. 
 
2.3. The implications of Stackelberg competition   
It is important to note that the leadership behaviour of firm 1 under entry is important 
for  our  result.  To  show  it,  consider  the  situation  where  firms  1  and  the  profit-
maximising firms produce like Cournot oligopolists under entry.  
Under  Cournot  competition,  firm  1  and  the  ith  private  firm  maximise  the 







q Max P q cq
+
− ∫                           (8) 
( )
i
i q MaxP q q ,  2,3,..., 1 i n = + .                      (9) 
The equilibrium outputs are given by 
P c =                             (10) 
  0 i P q P′ + = ,    2,3,..., 1 i n = + .                  (11) 
The total output is given by  ( ) i P n P q P c ′ + + =  or 
  P c = ,                                     (12) 
since  0 i P q P′ + = . 
  The total output, price of the product and the profit of firm 1 are the same 
under nationalised monopoly and Cournot competition under entry. Since the cost 
efficient entrants produce positive outputs while the total output remains the same   7
under  nationalised  monopoly  and  entry,  entry  increases  welfare  compared  to 
nationalised  monopoly  by  saving  the  cost  of  production.  Thus,  it  shows  that 
Stackelberg competition under entry is important for Proposition 1. 
  Our  example  with  the  linear  demand  curve,  P = a – q, shows that, under 
Cournot competition, the equilibrium output of firm 1, the equilibrium output of the 
ith entrant, total equilibrium outputs of the firms, price of the product, profit of firm 1, 
profit  of  the  ith  entrant  and  welfare  are  respectively  1 ( 1)
c q a c n = − + , 
c
i q c = , 
c q a c = − , 
c P c = ,  1 0
c π = , 
2 c
i c π =  and 
2 2 ( ) 2
2
c a c c n
W
− +
= . Hence, under Cournot 
competition, entry does not affect the profit of firm 1 and consumer surplus but it 
increases welfare compared to nationalised monopoly. 
  The reason for our result showing 
m c s P P P = <  follows easily from Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of nationalised monopoly, Cournot and Stackelberg 
 
The  reaction  curves  of  firm  1  and  the  profit-maximising  firms  taken  together  are 
drawn as  M R1 and  A R 1 − , respectively. The intersection of these curves, C, represents   8
Cournot equilibrium, whereas the intersection of  M R1 and the horizontal axis shows 
the output under nationalised monopoly. It follows from (10) that the slope of the 
nationalised  firm’s  reaction  curve  with  respect  to  the  total  outputs  of  the  profit-
maximising firms is -1. Hence, if there is Cournot competition under entry, output 
reduction by the nationalised firm is matched by the increase in the total outputs of the 
profit-maximising firms. Hence, entry does not change total outputs and consumer 
surplus compared to nationalised monopoly. 
However, Stackelberg equilibrium in Figure 1 is denoted as S, where the iso-
welfare function WW′ is tangent to  A R 1 − .
4 Since the absolute slope of  A R 1 −  (i.e., the 
reaction function of the profit-maximising firms taken together) is less than 1, the 
output reduction by the nationalised firm is larger than an increase in the total outputs 
of the profit-maximising firms. Hence, the total output reduces when the product-
market competition under entry changes from Cournot to Stackelberg. Thus, we get 
m c s P P P = < . 
 
3. Conclusion 
In contrast to the general belief that higher competition makes the consumers better 
off, we show that entry of profit-maximising firms makes the consumers worse off in 
the presence of a nationalised firm behaving like a Stackelberg leader under entry. 
Entry increases profit of the incumbent firm, industry profit and social welfare at the 
                                                 






W P q cq
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expense  of  the  consumers.  The  antitrust  authorities  should  be  careful  while 
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